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BUSINESS RECORDS AS EVIDENCE IN MISSOURI
T. E. LAUER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1949 Missouri became the seventeenth state to adopt the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Law, when it was enacted by the State General
Assembly.1 The Uniform Law made obsolete most prior Missouri law
applicable to the introduction of business entries, and its provisions immedi-
ately became the principal means of introducing business records into evi-
dence in this state. Earlier common law and statutory provisions have largely
been ignored since 1949.2
Historically, the law relating to the admissibility of business records into
evidence was divided into two distinct rules.' The "shop-book" rule con-
cerned the admissibility of the business records made by a shop-keeper or
tradesman who was a party to the action, and was principally of value be-
cause an interested party was disqualified as a witness. The rule made it
possible for the shop-keeper who had no employees to bring suit upon his
business accounts. The second rule related to book entries made in the
regular course of business at the time of the transaction by third persons
who had personal knowledge of the facts they were recording. Under this
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. Mo. Laws 1949, at 275. Before the Uniform Law's effective date in Missouri, it
was adopted by California (1941), Delaware (1945), Florida (1949), Idaho (1939),
Minnesota (1939), Montana (1937), New Jersey (1949), New York (1928), North
Dakota (1937), Ohio (1939), Oregon (1941), Pennsylvania (1939), South Dakota
(1939), Vermont (1939), Washington (1947), and Wyoming (1941). In 1941 the
Uniform Law was adopted by the Territory of Hawaii. Since 1949, the Act has been
adopted by Arizona (1951), Georgia (1952), Nebraska (1951), Nevada (1951), New
Hampshire (1953), Tennessee (1957), and Texas (1951); in 1957 it was adopted by
the Virgin Islands.
Some eleven other states have adopted legislation similar to the model act proposed
by the Commonwealth Fund Committee on Evidence in 1927. See MORGAN nT AL., Tun.
LAW OF EVIDENCE: SoME PROPOSALS FOR rrs REFORM 63 (1927).
2. Prior to 1949, the principal statutory provision on business records generally was
the account book statute, now Mo. REv. STAT. § 490.650 (1959). Other statutes dealt
with official records, corporate records, and the records of religious societies. Hospital
records were, before 1948, admitted as "official records" or records required by law to be
kept; some doubt was thrown upon this basis for admission by the adoption in that year
of the Uniform Vital Statistics Law, now Mo. REv. STAT. § § 193.010-.380. See Caruthers
and Gilcrest, Hospital Records and "The Business Records as Evidence Law," St. Louis
B.J., Oct. 1955, p. 39.
3. The historical development of the "shop-book rule" and the "regular entries" rule is
described fully in MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 597-606 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
OF EVmENCE 304-08 (1963); 5 WscMORE, EVMiENCE § 1518 (3d ed. 1940).
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rule, the person who made the record was required to testify, or it had to be
established that the maker was dead, insane, or otherwise unavailable as a
witness.' Both rules, of course, operated as exceptions to the hearsay rule by
making evidence admissible that otherwise would have been rejected on that
ground.
In the first half of the twentieth century it became increasingly clear that
the earlier rules relating to business entries were no longer adequate, and
that substantial revision was necessary in order to avoid injustice in a large
number of cases. In 1927 the Committee on Evidence appointed by the
Commonwealth Fund reported that correspondence with manufacturers and
wholesalers concerning their operations disclosed that "the number of opera-
tions required to complete a transaction and the record of it varies from two
or three to twenty-six and involves from two to one hundred and two per-
sons."' Plainly in more complex transactions it was not reasonably possible
to present the testimony of each person who had taken part, or to prove the
unavailability of such persons as a witness. Again, in 1948 the Evidence
Code Committee of The Missouri Bar called for a recognition of "the mod-
ern and more complicated methods of doing business and the resulting
complications with regard to record entries in the regular course of busi-
ness;"6 the committee proposed a statutory liberalization of the rule.'
The Missouri General Assembly responded to this growing criticism of
the law by enacting the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law in 1949,
thus passing in substance to the courts the burden of further liberalization
through interpretation of the Uniform Law.
The courts' initial response to the challenge was cautiously conservative,
in keeping with more than a century of Missouri judicial tradition. Thus in
1952 the Missouri Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, acknowledged
the legislative purpose: "The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law
. . . has the purpose of avoiding the many antiquated and technical rules
of common law regarding the admissibility of business records as evidence."8
With the passage of time the decisions involving the Uniform Law have be-
4. Thus in Missouri Forged Tool Co. v. St. Louis Car Co., 205 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1947), the court stated, "Proof of such records by the persons who made them
is necessary except where such persons are unavailable by reason of death, insanity, illness
preventing attendance, or absence from the jurisdiction."
5. MORGAN ET AL., supra note I at 61.
6. EVIDENCE CODE COMM. OF TEE Mo. BAR, MissouRI EVIDENCE CODE-PROPOSED
153 (1948).
7. Id. at 152-54.
8. Melton v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 474, 485, 251 S.W.2d 663, 669 (1952)
(en banc).
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come increasingly liberal; in 1956 the supreme court tersely explained this
policy: "To construe the act too strictly would be to repeal it."'
During the initial decade after the passage of the Uniform Law, however,
it was uncertain to what degree the courts would throw off the shackles of
the prior law; the decisions lacked a clear direction and at times appeared
to restrict the general purpose of the act. Then in 1959, in Rossomanno v.
Laclede Cab Co.,'" in an en banc decision, the Missouri Supreme Court
firmly swept away the vestiges of prior law by giving full meaning to the
language and intent of the Uniform Law. Subsequent opinions have fol-
lowed the lead of the Rossomanno case and have brought Missouri's law
relating to business records squarely into line with modern business practices
and with the views of modem writers. 1
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE UNIFORm LAW
A. The Requirements of the Uniform Law
The basic provisions of the Uniform Law, as they appear in the Missouri
statutes, are as follows:2
§ 490.670. "Business" defined.-The term "business" shall include
every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling or operation of
institutions, whether carried on for profit or not.
§ 490.680. Records, competent evidence, when.-A record of an act,
condition or event, shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if
the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the
mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of
business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in
the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and time
of preparation were such as to justify its admission.'"
Thus, under the express wording of the Uniform Law, the admissibility
of business records into evidence requires that (1) the record has been
9. Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Ser. Co., 365 Mo. 677, 285 S.W.2d 663, 666 (1956).
10. 328 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
11. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Alford, 351 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1961), where an official of the
U.S. Army Records Center in St. Louis was permitted to qualify army medical records
made elsewhere at a different date, while plaintiff was in military service, and with which
the witness was unfamiliar. Under the prevailing rule before adoption of the Uniform
Law, it would have been necessary to have called as a witness, or to have accounted for
the absence of, every person who had participated in the making of those medical records
before they could have been admitted into evidence.
12. Statutory references herein, unless otherwise specified, are to Mo. RaV. STAT.
(1959).
13. The Law as enacted contains two other sections:
§ 490.660. Sections 490.660 to 490.690 may be cited as "The Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Law."§ 490.690. Sections 490.660 to 490.690 shall be so interpreted and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
Washington University Open Scholarship
BUSINESS RECORDS AS EVIDENCE
made in the regular course of business; (2) the record has been made at
or near the time of the act, condition or event recorded; (3) the custodian
of the record or other qualified witness testify to its identity and the mode
of its preparation; (4) the court find that the sources of information, method
and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission; and (5) the
record be relevant.
Each of the foregoing requirements gives rise to a number of problems of
interpretation and application. In the fifteen years since the adoption of the
Uniform Law, the courts have been called upon many times to construe the
Law in the light of varying fact situations. The following pages contain a
discussion of these Missouri cases.
At the outset, however, several distinctions should perhaps be drawn. The
admission of business records into evidence falls under an exception to the
hearsay rule; business records which otherwise would be excluded as hearsay
are admitted because, being regularly kept and relied upon in business, they
impart a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. As such, evidence
offered under the business records exception should be differentiated from
writings or records which are used by a witness to refresh his recollection.
In the latter case, the writing itself is not considered as evidence, but merely
as an aid to the witness in giving his testimony. It is not the writing which
the court or jury considers (at least in theory it is not),14 but it is the oral
testimony of the witness, whose memory has been refreshed by the stimulus
of the writing. Clearly a writing or record used to refresh recollection need
not meet the standards of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law.
This distinction has not always been observed with nicety in the heat of
trial, and there appear to be cases in which a writing has been used by a
witness for the express purpose of refreshment, and later offered and ad-
mitted into evidence as a business record. 5
A second distinction should be drawn between business records and what
Wigmore describes as "past recollection recorded"' 6-a writing which re-
cords facts of which the witness has no independent recollection, but which
the witness earlier recognized as being a correct statement of the facts, when
they were fresh in his mind. Here, the writing itself is the evidence, and the
testimony of the witness verifying its initial correctness merely qualifies it,
since the witness is unable at the time of testifying to recall the facts con-
14. Morgan points out the danger very succinctly: "But when the means is a writing
asserting the very matter to be remembered, there is the clear danger that the imagina-
tion rather than the memory will be stimulated or that reconstruction will take the place
of recollection." BAsIC PROBLEMS OF EVMENcE 61 (1963).
15. Cf. King v. Furry, 317 S.W.2d 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
16. 3 WIGMORE, EVMENCE §§ 734-55 (3d ed. 1940).
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tamined therein. Wigmore points out that the admissibility of records of past
recollection is not a hearsay rule exception, and therefore such records need
not meet the qualifications of business records or other similar exceptions."
Accordingly, when the maker of the record testifies that he correctly re-
corded the facts known to him when they were fresh in his mind, but now
has no recollection of the facts, the record or writing need not be qualified
under the Uniform Law, but is admissible as a past recollection recorded."8
But where the witness through whom the writing is offered had no knowl-
edge of the facts at any time, it is clearly necessary to resort to the Uniform
Law and to comply with its requirements." Concededly, there is some over-
lap between these areas, as there are cases in which a writing would be ad-
missible under either theory.2"
Further, it should be noted that the Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Law does not provide the exclusive avenue of admissibility for several classes
of evidence which are the subject of special statutes, such as account books,2
acknowledged written instruments affecting real estate' and records of re-
ligious societies.2" Likewise, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized, prior
to the adoption of the Uniform Law, that there exists a hearsay rule excep-
tion "admitting official reports made by an officer on the basis of his own
personal investigation and knowledge, at least when required by statute,
ordinance, rule or regulation." 4 Recent cases have reaffirmed the existence
of this hearsay rule exception as to official written statements, pointing out
that it is not necessary to qualify such statements under the Uniform Law.2"
B. What Constitutes a "Business"
Section 490.670 defines "business" as including "every kind of business,
profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions, whether carried
on for profit or not." The question of whether a particular enterprise is a
17. Id. § 737(2).
18. See, e.g., State v. Bradley, 361 Mo. 267, 234 S.W.2d 556 (1950); Millaway v.
Brown, 197 S.W.2d 987 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946).
19. Cf. Wolf v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 336 Mo. 746, 81 S.W.2d 323 (1934).
20. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 280 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVI-
DfENCE 308-09 (1963).
21. Mo. REv. STAT. § 490.650 (1959).
22. Mo. REv. STAT. § 490.410 (1959).
23. Mo. RIv. STAT. § 490.260 (1959). Additional statutory provisions affecting other
writings and records are found throughout Mo. REv. STAT. ch. 490 (1959). See, e.g.,
State v. Edmonds, 347 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. 1961), pointing out that the Uniform Law does
not apply to records of judicial proceedings, which are governed by Mo. REv. STAT. §
490.130 (1959).
24. Snider v. Wimberly, 357 Mo. 491, 495, 209 S.W.2d 239, 241 (1948).
25. Capra v. Phillips Investment Co., 302 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. 1957) (en banc); cf.
State v. Washington, 335 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1960).
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business within the meaning of the Uniform Law has not often been directly
raised. In the leading case of Melton v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.,26 it was
contended that the Uniform Law did not apply to hospitals, but the supreme
court held that hospitals were businesses within the meaning of the Law,
although they were not specifically mentioned therein. And in a subsequent
decision a contention that the Uniform Law did not apply to a pathology
laboratory was rejected, the court pointing out that pathology is a pro-
fessionY
The courts have decided numerous other cases, involving myriad classes
of enterprises, in which the definition of "business" has not been directly in
question. Such enterprises have included: a grocery store, 28 a feed store,2"
a plastering and construction business,' an automobile dealer,"' an imple-
ment dealer,3" a trucking company,3 a railroad,34 a manufacturing com-
pany, 5 a real estate dealer,3" a loan company, 7 an insurance company,:" an
optometrist,3 a physician,"' a state mental hospital,"' a local chamber of
commerce,42 the State Department of Public Health and Welfare 3 and the
United States Army."
In view of the numerous classes which have been included, it appears
that the statute will be construed to embrace almost any regular enterprise
in which persons may engage. The only exception-and the courts have
26. 363 Mo. 474, 251 S.W.2d 663 (1952) (en bane).
27. York v. Daniels, 241 Mo. App. 809, 259 S.W.2d 109 (1953).
28. Hancock v. Crouch, 267 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
29. Boland v. Dehn, 348 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
30. George F. Robertson Plastering Co. v. Magidson, 271 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1954).
31. Adler v. Ewing, 347 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); King v. Furry, 317
S.W.2d 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
32. Ellis v. Farmer, 287 S.W.2d 840 (Mo. 1956).
33. Voyles v. Columbia Terminals Co., 239 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
34. Caffey v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 292 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
35. Happy v. Blanton, 303 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. 1957).
36. Sebree v. Rosen, 374 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1964); McLendon v. Leighty, 320 S.W.2d
735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (rental agent).
37. Glynn v. Glynn, 291 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
38. Randall v. Western Life Ins. Co., 336 S.W.2d 125 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
39. Kitchen v. Wilson, 335 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. 1960).
40. Rossomanno v. Laclede Cab Co., 328 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1959) (en banc); Fisher
v. Gunn, 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954); Rodenberg v. Nickels, 357 S.W.2d 551, 556-57
(Mo. Ct. App. 1962): "These Missouri statutes include the medical profession as a
'business.'"
41. State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1957).
42. Fredericktown Chamber of Commerce v. Chaney, 250 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. Ct. App.
1952).
43. Barnes v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 320 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. Ct. App.
1959).
44. Tomlin v. Alford, 351 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1961).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1964/iss1/6
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
not as yet been confronted with this problem-may lie in the area of casual
enterprise which is of an occasional or intermittent nature, or in which the
person keeping the records may engage in but a single isolated transaction."
C. Regular Course of Business
Section 490.680 requires that a record, to be admissible, must be "made
in the regular course of business." The courts have construed this to mean
that the record must have a reasonably close relationship to the regular con-
duct of the business, keeping in mind the nature of the business enterprise
and the normal practices employed in such enterprises. In looking at a par-
ticular business, it may also be important to ascertain the particular practices
of that business in the past, as well as any regularized procedures or rules
which employees must follow.
Clearly, where the content of the record indicates that the matter recorded
is beyond the normal or lawful scope of the business, the record will have
no standing as a "business record" under the Uniform Law. Thus in
Kitchen v. Wilson,4" an optometrist's record of an office examination was
held inadmissible when it contained statements that "the cervical sym-
pathetic ganglia which affect the focusing of the vision was injured in a car
wreck December 7, 1956," and that the examination verified "the existence
of a whiplash injury as the etiologic factor in the damage."4" The court
indicated that the "primary utility" of the record "was in litigating, not in
the practice of optometry," '48 and went on to hold that since the statutory
definition of optometry49 did not embrace diagnosing "whiplash injuries" or
the injury of cervical sympathetic ganglia, the record was not one made in
the regular course of business.
Similarly, in Voyles v. Columbia Terminals Co.,"0 one of the first cases
decided after the adoption of ihe Uniform Law, it was stated by way of
dictum that accident reports made by a trucking company after an accident
involving a company truck would not be "considered as records made in
the usual course of business. They constitute nothing more than a narration
45. See Hancock v. Crouch, 267 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954), where a personal
record book kept by an employee to record moneys paid out for the benefit of the
employer was held to be a business record.
46. 335 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. 1960).
47. Id. at 42.
48. Id. at 43, paraphrasing the leading case of Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109
(1943), which held that a railroad engineer's written statements, made after the accident,
were not in the regular course of business because the "primary utility" of the statements
was in litigating, not in railroading." 318 U.S. at 114.
49. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 336.010 (1959).
50. 239 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
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of past events strengthened in no way by the fact that they are in writing."'"
Whether or not a particular report or writing is required to be made by
an employee may be of significance in determining whether it has been made
in the regular course of business. Where the employee acts without authority
in making a record, it may be rejected.52 On the other hand, where a report
has been required by law or by some regulation connected with the employ-
ment, the courts have mentioned such fact favorably,5" although there
appears to be no Missouri decision in which admissibility under the Uniform
Law turns solely upon the question of whether the record was required to
be made by the agent or employee who made it.
The "regular course of business" involves not only the commercial or
other transactions in which the business engages, but embraces all facets of
the business activity. Thus, employment and personnel records kept by a
concern fall within the regular course of business;5 also included are any
medical records kept by the employer which relate to the employees.55
Office records made by a physician concerning the examination and
treatment of his patients clearly are made within the regular course of his
profession." However, where an orthopedic physician, some three and a
half months after examining a patient, wrote a letter to the patient's attorney
reporting on the examination, the letter did not qualify under the Uniform
Law; nor did a copy of the letter sent to the referring physician qualify:
"This proffered document was not a record 'made in the regular course of
business,' by either of the doctors."5 "
Turning to hospital records, it has been held to be in the regular course
of business to record the statements of a patient as to how he was injured,
when such information is relevant and "helpful to or of aid in the diagnosis
of the patient's injury."'  On the other hand, where no connection is shown
51. Id. at 562.
52. Cf. Ensminger v. Stout, 287 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
53. Ryan v. Campbell "66" Express, Inc., 304 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. 1957) (en bane);
Capra v. Phillips Investment Co., 302 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. 1957) (en bane).
54. Happy v. Blanton, 303 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. 1957) (record included complaints
made by employee's husband after she was "discontinued as industrially unsuited
[fired?]"); Dickerson v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 365 Mo. 738, 286 S.W.2d 820 (Mo.
1956) (en bane).
55. Cf. Tomlin v. Alford, 351 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1961) (army medical records).
56. Fisher v. Gunn, 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954).
57. Rodenberg v. Nickels, 357 S.W.2d 551, 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962).
58. Melton v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 474, 487, 251 S.W.2d, 663, 671
(1952) (en bane). This rule was somewhat expanded by dictum in the subsequent case
of Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 365 Mo. 677, 682, 285 S.W.2d 663, 667 (1956),
where it was said that the admissible part of a duly qualified hospital record should
include "those parts of the patient's history inherently necessary (or at least helpful) to
the observation, diagnosis and treatment of the patient."
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between the course of the patient's treatment and the making of the record,
it will be rejected. Thus, where it was sought to introduce a "narrative
summary" dated two weeks after the patient had been admitted to the
hospital and one day before his discharge, and which was apparently a com-
pilation of the original hospital record entries, the court held that the narra-
tive summary did not have "the status of a business entry within the meaning
of the Act."59
D. Time and Manner of Preparation and Sources of Information
Section 490.680 further requires that a business record, to be admissible,
must have been made "at or near the time of the act, condition or event"
recorded, and that the "sources of information, method and time of prepara-
tion" of the record must have been such, in the trial court's opinion, "as to
justify its admission." These requirements give rise to questions as to how
soon after the act, condition or event the record must have been made; what
methods of preparation and sources of information are adequate in order to
qualify records under the Uniform Law; whether only the original business
record is admissible or if secondary records made therefrom may be quali-
fied; and how proof of the time and method of preparation and the sources
of information is to be made.
It is quite clear from the language of the Uniform Law that some show-
ing must be made as to the time and manner of preparation and the sources
of information from which the record was derived, and the Missouri courts
have repeatedly so held.6" The appellate courts have upheld the rejection
by the trial courts of records where no such showing was made;1 and one
decision was reversed because of the admission of hospital records when the
time and manner of their preparation had not been shown. 2
Records which are made at the very time of the act, condition or event
which they record are admissible under the statute. Thus, a record con-
sisting of observations dictated by a pathologist to his laboratory technician
during the course of a post-mortem examination was properly qualified as
59. Gray v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 363 Mo. 864, 871, 254 S.W.2d 577, 580
(1953).
60. See, e.g., Ellis v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 365 Mo. 614, 624, 285
S.W.2d 634, 641 (1955) (en bane).
61. State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1957); Conser v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
266 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 848 (1954); State v. McCormack,
263 S.W. 2d 344 (Mo. 1954).
62. Lockhart v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 318 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. 1958). Although the
ruling in this case was partially overruled in Rossomanno v. Laclede Cab Co., 328 S.W.2d
677 (Mo. 1959) (en bane), it appears that under the Rossomanno ruling at least some
showing as to the time of preparation must be made.
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to time,"3 as would be a record of a condition or event made by a mechanical
recording device, such as a speed tape from a railroad locomotive."
On the other hand, where a considerable time interval has elapsed be-
tween the act or event and the making of the record, the record will be re-
jected as not complying with the statute. Thus, as mentioned above, where
a hospital record containing findings of a physical examination connected
with a patient's admission was not made until two weeks after the admission,
the record was plainly not made "at or near" the time of the examination.6 5
No reported Missouri decisions have involved close or difficult questions
as to whether the time at which a particular record was prepared was or
was not "at or near the time of the act, condition or event." Of necessity,
then, any discussion of the problem involves an element of speculation. Un-
doubtedly, however, the determination in the first analysis will be left to the
discretion of the trial court, and the appellate courts will interfere only in
the event of an abuse of such discretion. Among the factors which might
well be considered by an appellate court, in addition to the actual amount
of elapsed time between the event and preparation of the record, are the
nature and complexity of the information recorded, the training and skill
of the person who made the record, whether the record was in fact made at
the first reasonable opportunity, and the normal practices followed in the
particular business as to the time of making records.
In this connection, Wigmore stresses that the entry should have been
made at or near the time of the event, "not merely . . . to assure a fairly
accurate recollection of the matter, but because any trustworthy habit of
making regular business records will ordinarily involve the making of the
record contemporaneously.""
It is essential that the party seeking to introduce a business record offer
some evidence as to the preparation of the record. While it may not be
necessary to describe the preparation in great detail, nevertheless some show-
ing thereof should be made; otherwise the court may, in its discretion, reject
the record. Thus, where the custodian of a hospital record merely "identi-
fied" the record, the propriety of its admission into evidence was question-
able. 67
63. York v. Daniels, 241 Mo. App. 809, 259 S.W.2d 109 (1953).
64. See Caffey v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 292 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
65. Gray v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 363 Mo. 864, 254 S.W.2d 577 (1953).
See also Holloway v. Shepardson, 364 Mo. 14, 258 S.W.2d 656 (1953), involving the
admissibility of a monthly statement mailed out by a lumber yard; the statement, which
was prepared from original sales tickets and the journal and ledger of the lumber busi-
ness, was held inadmissible because it was not a business record but a narrative of past
events.
66. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1526 (3d ed. 1940).
67. Lang v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 364 Mo. 1147, 273 S.W.2d 270 (1954).
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Interestingly, the qualifications of the person who actually made the
record have seldom been questioned. For example, a hospital record
generally consists of entries by a number of persons, who in theory at least
are highly skilled, ranging from physicians to licensed practical nurses. It is
also possible, of course, for relatively unskilled persons such as hospital aides
to participate in the making of a hospital record. Yet when the hospital
record is produced at trial by a medical records librarian or other custodian,
it may not be possible to identify the maker of any particular part of the
record, much less submit him to cross examination or challenge his pro-
fessional competency."8
On the other hand, it is clear that the person who made the record must
ordinarily have had some personal knowledge of what was being recorded,
or must have been furnished such information in the regular course of busi-
ness by a person who had personal knowledge of the facts recorded. This
requirement is discussed under part G, infra.
A primitive, irregular or unusual method of record keeping will not affect
the admissibility of a business record if the other statutory qualifications are
met, although the weight to be given such a record is for the jury to deter-
mine. Thus, where a store clerk was requested by his employers to keep a
record of disbursements made personally by him on their behalf, the fact
that his "account book was kept in crude form and that his 'bookkeeping'
was of the most elementary character" did not preclude its admission in an
action by him to recover such advances. " Nor was it significant in this case
that it was somewhat unconventional to keep records for this purpose; there
was a sufficient connection between the store business and the records to
bring them within the scope of the Uniform Law. And in a subsequent case
where the only account records kept by a feed store consisted of original
sales tickets which, after delivery of the merchandise, were placed under the
customer's name in a steel filing cabinet, the court conceded that the
"method of bookkeeping was certainly unusual," but held that the records
were adequate under the Uniform Law.7'
The sources of information from which the record was prepared must
have been adequate to justify admission of the record. Normally, the nature
of the business and the regular practices of employees and others will pro-
68. In this connection, some consideration should perhaps be given to whether the
anonymous entrant is more likely to be believed by the jury than is a witness who
appears in court and is subjected to the jury's scrutiny as to his appearance and manner,
and to cross examination by opposing counsel. This problem may become salient when
one's witness is of particularly unattractive disposition or unconvincing manner and
appearance.
69. Hancock v. Crouch, 267 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
70. Boland v. Dehn, 348 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
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vide ample basis for a finding that the sources of information for the busi-
ness records were adequate. Where, however, it appears from additional
evidence that the sources of information were inadequate, the business record
based thereon will be rejected. An almost classical example appears in Kraus
v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co.,7 ' where the proffered hospital record recited,
"This patient was first seen in the Emergency Room on the evening of
February 13 with the history of having fainted when she attempted to get
on a bus. Fell backwards, striking her head on the pavement."72 Other
evidence, however, established that the patient had been rendered uncon-
scious by the fall, and remained in that state until after she reached the
hospital. The supreme court held that the trial court properly rejected the
hospital record, since it was justified in finding that the patient could not
have given the history attributed to her. 3
Need a business record be an "original entry" in order to be admissible?
In the regular course of a business, original sales tickets may be recorded
in an account book or on some other form of credit record, and the original
tickets destroyed. If only the original entry is admissible, will the account
book or other credit record in such a case qualify? The common law view
as stated by Wigmore was that where the original sales tickets have been
accounted for "as lost or otherwise unavailable," the records made from
the tickets will be admissible.74
Under the Uniform Law it is not clear whether the original sales tickets
or other memoranda must be accounted for before a secondary record will
be admissible. In cases where the secondary record offered in evidence has
been made a substantial time after the act or event recorded, and there is no
showing that the original record was unavailable, the secondary record has
been rejected. And in George F. Robertson Plastering Co. v. Magidson,"6
71. 269 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1954).
72. Id. at 746.
73. See also Glynn v. Glynn, 291 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956), where the
court, considering the admissibility of business records purporting to show the manner
of indorsement of a lost note, said: "The determination of whether a satisfactory founda-
tion has been laid for the admission of the record in this case or the reading of the record
into the evidence is for the trial court."
74. 5 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1532 (3d ed. 1940).
75. See, e.g., Holloway v. Shepardson, 364 Mo. 14, 258 S.W.2d 656 (1953); Gray
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 363 Mo. 864, 254 S.W.2d 577 (1953). Compare Douglas
v. Farrow, 334 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. 1960).
76. 271 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1954). Adherence to the common law approach is also
found in O'Connor v. Egan, 274 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955), where refer-
ence was made to § 490.650 (the account book statute), and the court said: "Under the
law record testimony offered to establish the account sued upon must be an original book
of entry, and the entries must have been shown to have been correctly made contempo-
raneously with the transaction."
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a secondary record was admitted where the dray tickets and other memo-
randa from which it was made were dstroyed after being recorded. How-
ever, in Fredericktown Chamber of Commerce v. Chaney,"' it was held that
a ledger into which information concerning subscription pledges was copied
was admissible as evidence of such pledges even though the original pledges
themselves were apparently available; the ledger itself was said to be an
"original record" prepared in the regular course of business.
Passing reference should be made to the admissibility of photostatic copies
of business records. The recent case of Thomas v. Wade"8 indicates that
there may be some doubt as to the admissibility of such photostatic copies
when the original has not been produced, although in that case the problem
was solved by an express waiver by the objecting party as to the authenticity
of the record. However, it appears that the court may well have overlooked
sections 109.120 and 109.130, Mo. REv. STAT. 1959, which provide that
any business records may be "photographed, microphotographed, photo-
stated or reproduced on film," and that such reproduction "shall be deemed
to be an original record for all purposes, and shall be admissible in evidence
in all courts or administrative agencies."
How is the party offering a business record in evidence to prove that it
was made "at or near the time of the act, condition or even recorded"?
Obviously, if this requirement it to be strictly enforced, the proponent must
call as a witness the person who made the record, or some other person
who was present when the record was made. But such strict construction
of the statute would have the effect of defeating the purposes for which
the Uniform Law was adopted.
The early Missouri cases decided under the Uniform Law indicated that
a substantial showing had to be made as to the time and manner of prepara-
tion of a record before it would be admitted in evidence. Thus in Conser v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.,"9 it was held error to admit Veterans' Administra-
tion hospital records from Wichita, Kansas, solely upon the highly equivocal
testimony of a custodian who was an attorney and examiner for the St.
Louis V.A. Regional Office. In its opinion the court emphasized that "the
witness was not in the hospital department, had nothing to do with keeping
the record and had no personal knowledge about that.""0 Likewise in Lang
77. 250 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952). See-also York v. Daniels, 241 Mo. App.
309, 259 S.W.2d 109 (1953), where the record was originally made in longhand on a
yellow pad and subsequently transcribed; the record as transcribed was held admissible
although the original notes were available.
78. 361 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. 1962) (en banc).
79. 266 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
80. Id. at 592.
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v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,8 ' where a hospital record librarian merely
"identified" certain records in her custody, the court intimated that there
was some doubt as to the admissibility of the records, but did not find it
necessary to decide that question because the records were not otherwise
prejudicicial.
It was clear, however, that although some evidence of the time and
manner of preparation of the record was necessary, it was not necessary for
the qualifying witness to have personal knowledge or recollection as to the
making of the record in question. Thus in Fisher v. Gunn,8 2 the witness was
a secretary in the physician's office where the record was prepared, and had
been employed there at the time it was made. She described the normal office
procedure for making records of the examinations of patients, but admitted
that she had no memory as to the preparation of the particular record.
Holding that the medical record was properly admitted, the court said:
A qualified witness testified as to the mode of the record's preparation,
and that it was made in the regular course of business. We do not think
it was essential that the custodian have had personal knowledge or
recollection that these particular entries were made "at or near the time
of the act, condition, or event" so long as she had personal knowledge
that all like entries were made, in the regular course of business of that
particular office, at the time of the "act, condition or event." This unless
there was other evidence which indicated or tended to show that the
regular course of business was not followed with reference to the entries
on the particular record."
Likewise, in a subsequent decision, Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., the
records were held admissible where their "temporary custodian" admitted
he had no knowledge as to the preparation of the particular records, but
"related in detail the practice in the particular office in question in the
preparation of such records, both as to mode and time." 4
Although it was apparently not necessary for the making of the particular
record to be detailed, testimony as to the time and mode of preparation was
still essential. Thus in Lockhart v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.,85 the custodian
of hospital records testified that the records were "made and kept during
the general course of the business" of the hospital, but did not, apparently,
refer to the time or method of preparation. The Missouri Supreme Court
held that the trial court improperly admitted this record, stressing that
81. 364 Mo. 1147, 273 S.W.2d 270 (1954).
82. 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954).
83. Id. at 878.
84. 365 Mo. 677, 685, 285 S.W.2d 663, 669 (1956).
85. 318 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. 1958).
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unless there is proof . . . as to "the mode of its preparation" and that
it was made "at or near the time of the act, condition or event" it is not
shown to be a business entry and hence is hearsay and inadmissible.
It is obvious that plaintiff failed to make the required proof as to
the records in question and it therefore follows that they were inad-
missible. 6
The Lockhart decision was succeeded within a year by the leading case
of Rossomanno v. Laclede Cab Co.,"T in which a physician's office record
was admitted into evidence after having been qualified by an employee of
the physician who could not testify from her own knowledge as to the time
and manner of preparation of the record because she was a new employee
and had not been employed in the office at the time the record was made.
The Missouri Supreme Court, in an opinion by Judge Storckman, affirmed
the action of the trial court, emphasizing the "presumption of regularity"
which arose when the source of the records was shown. The opinion pointed
out that "The testimony of the witness as to the 'mode of preparation' need
not be based on personal knowledge.""5 Regarding the requirement that the
time of preparation be shown, Judge Storckman suggested parenthetically
that the courts might take judicial notice of the fact that physicians keep
records of their patients, and that such records are made contemporaneously
with the observation of the patient by the physician. In view of the nature
of the records and the testimony presented by the witness, it could not be
said as a matter of law that the trial court had abused its discretion in ad-
mitting the physician's record. The Lockhart decision was expressly over-
ruled insofar as it conflicted with the Rossomanno holding.
The Rossomanno decision appears to have extended the "circumstantial
probability of trustworthiness"8 9 of business records-which is perhaps the
principal reason for allowing their admissibility as a hearsay rule exception
-to the qualification of the records themselves. Although the case does not
suggest that no testimony whatever need be presented, or even that mere
"identification" is sufficient, it does indicate that only a minimum of quali-
fying testimony is required. The determination is largely within the discre-
tion of the trial court, and the nature of the records in question may supply
a major part of the foundation required for admissibility.
86. Id. at 179.
87. 328 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
88. Id. at 683.
89. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1522 (3d ed. 1940). Earlier Missouri decisions
under the Uniform Law had referred to the "circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness"
furnished by the fact that the records were kept in the regular course of business, but
none had applied this principle to the testimony required to qualify the records. See,
e.g., Hancock v. Crouch, 267 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
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E. Custodian or Other Qualified Witness
The Uniform Law requires that the "custodian or other qualified witness"
testify to the identity and the mode of preparation of the record in order to
qualify it for admission. It should be noted that this requirement is separate
from the necessary finding by the court that "the sources of information,
method and time of preparation were such as to justify" admission of the
record. Of course, in the ordinary case the custodian or other qualified
witness will supply the necessary facts from which the court's finding as to
sources of information and method and time of preparation will be made.
From the statutory language, either the custodian of the records or some
other qualified witness may be called to establish the identity and mode of
preparation of the records. This has been construed by the courts to mean
that either the person in whose custody the records are normally kept, or any
other person who is competent to identify the records and describe the mode
of their preparation, may be called as a witness to qualify the records for
admission.9"
In a number of reported Missouri decisions, the witness offered as the
"custodian or other qualified witness" has been the person who prepared the
record, in whole or in part." In these instances the witness has clearly been
able to identify the record and to testify as to the mode of preparation of the
particular record, and the requirements of the Uniform Law have unques-
tionably been satisfied thereby.
Another group of cases have involved a witness who did not participate
in making the record, but who was employed in the business at the time the
record was made, and who could testify from his own immediate knowledge
and observation as to the mode of preparation of the records.9 Such witness
may or may not have been the custodian of the records, but in all cases has
been able to furnish the requisite identification of the records as being those
of the business in question. It has consistently been held that such witnesses
90. See, e.g., State v. Redding, 357 S.W.2d 103 (Mo. 1962); Allen v. St. Louis Pub.
Serv. Co., 365 Mo. 677, 285 S.W.2d 663 (1956); Conser v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.,
266 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
91. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Wilson, 335 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. 1960); Fisher v. Gunn, 270
S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954); Boland v. Dehn, 348 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); York
v. Daniels, 241 Mo. App. 809, 259 S.W.2d 109 (1953).
92. Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 365 Mo. 677, 285 S.W.2d 663 (1956); Her-
mann v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 345 S.W.2d 399 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); cf. Caffey v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 292 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956). In a number of
reported decisions it was not indicated whether the witness had been associated with the
business at the time the record was made, but the question was not raised as to whether
this was necessary. See, e.g., Happy v. Blanton, 303 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. 1957); State v.
Churchill, 299 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1957).
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are competent to qualify the records for admission under the Uniform Law,
although they admittedly have no personal knowledge of the preparation of
the records; it is required only that the general method of preparation of
such records be established. Thus, in Ellis v. State Dep't of Pub. Health and
Welfare, 3 the Missouri Supreme Court explained that it was not necessary
to produce as a witness the person who prepared the report:
Of course, the report must be identified by someone before it is ad-
missible and Section 490.680 makes sufficient the identification by a
custodian or other qualified witness who testifies to its identity and
mode of its preparation; and it is then only necessary also to show that
it was made in the regular course of business at or near the time of the
examination. Certainly this does not require the doctor who made the
report to be a witness, as provision is specifically made for any qualified
witness to testify to the essential facts .... 04
A third class of cases has presented a somewhat more difficult problem.
Here, the witness has been able to identify the records as being those of the
business, but has not been able to furnish much competent evidence as to
the mode of preparation. Although the earlier cases tended to reject records
which had only been "identified,""5 recent cases have not laid down any
firm rule, but have largely left to the discretion of the trial court the de-
termination of whether the mode of preparation has been adequately estab-
lished. Thus in Rossomanno v. Laclede Cab Co.,"6 where a physician's office
records had been made a half-dozen years previously, but the witness had
only been employed in the office for one month at the time of her testimony,
it was clear that the witness could not of her own knowledge testify to the
mode of preparation of the records in question. The witness's only sources
of information concerning the mode of preparation were the office practices
followed during the short period of her employment, which were of doubtful
probative value, and what she had been told by others as to earlier practices,
which was clearly hearsay. Nevertheless, the Missouri Supreme Court held
that the admission of the records into evidence was properly within the dis-
cretion of the trial court, pointing out that the evidence as to the source of
the records raised a presumption as to their regularity."'
93. 365 Mo. 614, 285 S.W.2d 634 (1955) (en bane).
94. Id. at 624, 285 S.W.2d at 641-42.
95. See, e.g., Lang v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 364 Mo. 1147, 273 S.W.2d 270
(Mo. 1954); Conser v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 266 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
96. 328 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1959) (en bane).
97. Id. at 682, quoting from 20 Am. JUR. Evidence § 1043 (1959 Supp.). In support
of its holding the court cited Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 365 Mo. 677, 285 S.W.2d
663 (1956); but it should be pointed out that the witnesses in the Allen case were em-
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A different phase of the problem was involved in Tomlin v. Alford,9"
where the St. Louis custodian of U. S. Army medical records possessed no
knowledge of the actual conditions under which the records were made, but
was permitted to qualify the records by testifying from his personal knowl-
edge as to the army regulations under which such records were required to
be made and kept, and that the particular records complied with the regu-
lations. In upholding the admission of the records into evidence, the supreme
court stressed the practical impossibility of establishing in any other way the
mode of preparing the records.
Although the courts have thus taken a liberal attitude toward the statu-
tory requirement that testimony be adduced as to the identity and mode of
preparation of the record, it is clear that some minimum standards remain
which must be met. Thus in the recent case of Olsten v. Susman,9" where a
police report was sought to be introduced, and the officer through whom
the record was offered testified that he had no personal knowledge of the
report or of its preparation, his testimony was insufficient to qualify the
report for admission in evidence.
F. Discretion of the Trial Court
One of the conditions set forth in the Uniform Law for admission of a
business record into evidence is that "in the opinion of the court, the sources
of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its
admission." This provision places in the trial court a sizable element of
discretion in determining whether a business record has been properly
qualified under the Uniform Law. The Missouri appellate courts have con-
tinually stressed this element of discretion in dealing with questions of ad-
missibility under the Law.
Clearly, it has been recognized that it is the function of the trial court to
determine whether a satisfactory foundation has been laid for the admission
of a business record into evidence." In this connection, it is for the court to
determine admissibility of the record in the first instance, while the jury
ployees of the businesses involved at the time the records were made, and could therefore
testify from their own knowledge as to the mode of preparation. The Rossomanno case
represents a substantial departure from earlier decisions such as Gray v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 363 Mo. 864, 872, 254 S.W.2d 577, 580 (1953), where one of the reasons
given for rejecting an "identified" hospital record was that "No testimony was offered
to show the 'mode of its preparation.'"
98. 351 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1961). See also State v. Redding, 357 S.W.2d 103 (Mo.
1962).
99. 362 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. 1962).
100. Glynn v. Glynn, 291 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
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determines the "weight and value" to be given a record once it has been
admitted.' °
In the early cases decided under the Uniform Law, there appeared to be
some tendency to minimize the trial court's discretion in the admission of
business records. Thus in the 1953 case of Gray v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry.,0 2 where the trial court had granted a new trial on the basis that it had
erroneously excluded a hospital record offered by plaintiff, the supreme
court said: "In the instant case, whether the hospital record was admissible
was a question of law. There is no discretion as to matters of law."1 3 A
year later, in Fisher v. Gunn,'04 the wide discretion of the trial court was
emphasized-but it was held that the court had erred in excluding an
exhibit.
Since then the appellate courts have continued to place emphasis upon
the broad degree of discretion possessed by the trial court under the Uniform
Law; and in addition they have in almost every case upheld the action of
the trial court in admitting or excluding a business record offered under the
Law." 5 Thus in Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Sew. Co., the court said in uphold-
ing the trial court's admission of a hospital record, "Much discretion must
remain in the trial court ... "10 In Dickerson v. St. Louis Pub. Serv.
Co., affirming the action of the trial court rejecting an employment record
of a physical examination, it was stated that "the court is expressly given
much discretion under the very wording of that statute."'0 7 And, in Rosso-
manno v. Laclede Cab Co., the supreme court said, "The trial court must
of necessity be given a large discretion in his determination of whether the
statutory requirements for admission of the business record have been satis-
factorily complied with."'08
101. Hancock v. Crouch, 267 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954). See also State v.
Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7, 13 (Mo. 1957): "[I]t was the court's function, and not the func-
tion of the jury, to pass on the competency of the witness." And compare Adler v.
Ewing, 347 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961): "Moreover, a determination of the
admissibility of such evidence by the trial court will not be disturbed if supported by
substantial, although conflicting, inferences therefrom."
102. 363 Mo. 864, 254 S.W.2d 577 (1953). The trial court's function was apparently
recognized, however, in Kraus v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 269 S.W.2d 743 (Mo.
1954).
103. Id. at 872, 254 S.W.2d at 580.
104. 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954).
105. The notable exception is Lockhart v. St. Louis Pub. Sent. Co., 318 S.W.2d 177
(Mo. 1958), which was overruled at least in part by Rossomanno v. Laclede Cab Co.,
328 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
106. 365 Mo. 677, 683, 285 S.W.2d 663, 667 (1956).
107. 365 Mo. 738, 750, 286 S.W.2d 820, 827 (1956) (en banc).
108. 328 S.W.2d 677, 683 (Mo. 1959) (en banc). Hermann v. St. Louis Pub. Sert.
Co., 345 S.W.2d 399, 405 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961), contains much the same language. See
also State v. Weindorf, 361 S.W.2d 806, 811 (Mo. 1962).
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However, it must be pointed out that the discretion in the trial court is
not boundless; it is necessary that the requirements of the statute be satisfied
to some degree before a business record will be admissible.Y9
In deferring strongly to the trial court's discretion, the Missouri appellate
courts have unquestionably reinforced to a substantial degree their efforts
to effect a broad and liberal judicial interpretation of the Uniform Law.
For were the upper courts to restrict this discretion, it is very likely that the
lower courts would in response place a narrower interpretation upon the
Law, and thereby defeat its purpose at least in part. Instead, the supreme
court and courts of appeals have wisely chosen to lead rather than to drive
the trial courts to an interpretation and application of the Uniform Law
which is consonant with the legislative intent.
G. Content of Record
Where a record has been qualified under the Uniform Law in regard
to identification and the time and manner of preparation, the record must
be shown to contain relevant and competent evidence in order to be ad-
missible. The Uniform Law requires that the record be relevant; and the
courts have imposed further requirements in order to exclude records which,
although made in the regular course of business, contain incompetent or
prejudicial evidence.
Where the content of the record is self-serving, in that the maker is now a
party to the action in court, and has made the record at least partially in
contemplation of litigation, the record may be rejected. This rule would
apply, for example, to accident reports made by a trucking company.' 0 Of
course, any record made by a party is somewhat suspect, but where a copy
of the record has been furnished to the adversary party,"' or where the
adversary party had a right to inspect the record,"' the danger of misrepre-
sentation is minimized. Further, the fact that the maker used and relied
upon the record in his business, and that its sole purpose was not for litiga-
tion, is of importance."' Where the record has been made by a third person,
not a party to the litigation, the self-serving objection may not be appli-
109. Cf. State v. Winn, 324 S.W.2d 637 (Mo. 1959).
110. Cf. Voyles v. Columbia Terminals Co., 239 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
The leading case in this area is Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), dealing with
the federal act. See also Kitchen v. Wilson, 335 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. 1960) (if made for
self-serving purpose of use in litigation, records are inadmissible).
111. George F. Robertson Plastering Co. v. Magidson, 271 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1954).
112. Hancock v. Crouch, 267 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
113. George F. Robertson Plastering Co. v. Magidson, 271 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1954)
(plaintiff used records "for its social security and other taxes").
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cable;114 but this is not true where the record, although made by a third
person, contains self-serving declarations of one of the parties. Thus, in
Terrell v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R.," 5 that portion of a hospital record
containing plaintiff's statement as to how he was injured was held inad-
missible because self-serving.
Hospital records constitute one of the principal classes of records sought
to be introduced under the Uniform Law, and pose numerous problems be-
cause of the many kinds of information that may be recorded in them. The
leading Missouri case is Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.,"' in which the
court laid down the following general rule:
It would seem that the following parts of a duly authenticated and
qualified hospital record should be admissible, unless subject to specific
objections such as irrelevancy, inadequate sources of information, as
being self-serving, as going beyond the bounds of legitimate expert
opinion, or on similar substantive grounds: the physical examination
findings, the patient's symptoms and complaints, treatment and progress
records, diagnoses by those qualified to make them, the results of
analyses and laboratory tests, X-rays, the behavior of the patient, and
those parts of the patient's history inherently necessary (or at least help-
ful) to the observation, diagnosis and treatment of the patient . .. ."I
In this connection, a question arises as to the admissibility of expert
opinion which is contained in a medical or other business record. The
Allen case held that expert medical opinion contained in a hospital record
should "be accorded dignity equal to that of a similar opinion from the
witness stand.""' 8 There, it was shown by testimony in court that the source
of the expert opinion was a resident physician at the hospital, and the court
said "from this we may presume his qualifications." However, it should be
added that in every case some showing should be made as to the qualifica-
tions of the person who delivered the expert opinion; and in the absence of
such showing, the trial court clearly has discretion to reject the record."'
Such qualification may, it would seem, be established either by testimony in
court, or by facts appearing from the record itself.
114. Cf. Fisher v. Gunn, 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954).
115. 327 S.W. 2d 230 (Mo. 1959).
116. 365 Mo. 677, 285 S.W.2d 663 (1956). As to hospital records generally, see
Caruthers and GiIcrest, Hospital Records and "The Business Records as Evidence Law,"
ST. Louis B.J., Oct. 1955, p. 39; Comment, "Admissibility of Hospital Records as Evi-
dence in Missouri," 24 Mo. L. Rav. 51 (1959).
117. 365 Mo. 682, 285 S.W.2d at 667.
118. Ibid.
119. See Dickerson v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 365 Mo. 738, 286 S.W.2d 820 (1956)
(en bane), where the court indicated that some identification of the purported expert
who made the record should be furnished, at least by the record itself.
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Although the hearsay objection to business records is obviated by the Uni-
form Law, it is clear that the record itself must not contain hearsay. Thus
in Ryan v. Campbell "66" Express, Inc., the court said that the Uniform
Law "eliminates the hearsay objection when such a record is properly quali-
fied thereunder, but it does not make admissible any evidence which would
be incompetent if offered in person."' 0 Does this mean that the maker of
the record must have had personal knowledge as to the facts recorded? The
cases are not altogether clear; those involving police reports have stressed
the need for personal knowledge on the part of the reporting officer. 2' On
the other hand, it is clear in the normal course of business that the entrant
very often does not possess personal knowledge of the facts he is recording.
Thus, where goods are delivered by a truck driver, that fact may be orally
reported to a clerk or bookkeeper, who makes an appropriate business record
entry. In such cases, the record is clearly admissible although the maker had
no personal knowledge."' Only where it appears that neither the entrant
nor any employee who had a duty to report to the entrant had any knowl-
edge of the facts will the record be rejected. 3 Clearly this is in accord
with established business practices and with the basic purpose of the Uni-
form Law.
Where the record contains hearsay, it may nevertheless be admissible
under an established hearsay rule exception, such as that relating to admis-
sions by a party-opponent. Cases involving admissibility of admissions con-
tained in business records have dealt most often with statements contained
in medical records made by the patient as to the cause of his injury or as
to his medical history."2
Finally, the record itself may contain abbreviations, technical expressions
and other data which need interpretation or translation in order to be in-
telligible to the court or jury. The presence of such terms in a business
record does not make it inadmissible, but the custodian or some other wit-
ness will be allowed to explain the meaning of the symbols or terms used.'25
120. 304 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
121. See, e.g., Winterton v. Van Zandt, 351 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1961); Ryan v. Camp-
bell "66" Express, Inc., 304 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. 1957) (en banc); Ensminger v. Stout,
287 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956). See also Capra v. Phillips Investment Co., 302
S.W.2d 924 (Mo. 1957) (en banc), involving a fire department report.
122. Boland v. Dehn, 348 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
123. Cf. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons, Inc., 365 Mo. 682, 250
S.W.2d 692 (Mo. 1952).
124. See, e.g., Baugh v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1957); Fisher v.
Gunn, 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954); Melton v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 474,
251 S.W.2d 663 (1952) (en banc). Cf. Douglas v. Farrow, 334 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. 1960).
125. State v. Cheatham, 340 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1960) (interpretation of terms con-
tained in pathologist's report); Fisher v. Gunn, 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954) (abbrevia-
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H. The Element of Necessity
At common law a requisite element of the admissibility of business records
was necessity. That is to say, it was necessary to admit the records as evi-
dence of the facts contained because it was not otherwise possible to prove
those facts. If the facts could be established by the testimony of the person
who made the record, and such person was available as a witness, then there
was no necessity for the records and they would be excluded. 2 As pointed
out by Wignore, 27 there were instances of absolute impossibility of establish-
ing the facts without using the record because the witnesses who might have
testified were dead, insane, too ill to testify, or absent from the jurisdiction;
and there were also instances of practical impossibility, where it would have
been extremely difficult to produce all of the clerks, salesmen, or other em-
ployees who had participated in making the record. As late as 1947 Missouri
recognized the requirement of necessity in Missouri Forged Tool Co. v. St.
Louis Car Co.,' where business records were rejected in the absence of a
showing that the persons who made the records were unavailable.
The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law makes no reference to
the principle of necessity; it does not appear from the statute that the ad-
missibility of business records is predicated upon either the absolute or prac-
tical impossibility of producing as witnesses the person or persons who made
the record. This is understandable, since one of the basic reasons for the
form of the Uniform Law was the difficulty of proving that the person who
made the record was unavailable.
It is true that in several reported Missouri decisions under the Uniform
Law the maker of the record has been unavailable, because of illness or
death. "' However, it is quite clear from other decisions that the factor of
unavailability is not to be considered in determining the admissibility of
business records. The outstanding case may be Rossomanno v. Laclede Cab
Co.,' where a physician's office records were admitted by the court through
tions in physician's records); Caffey v. St. Louis San-Francisco Ry., 292 S.W.2d 611 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1956) (railroad speed tape). Compare Boland v. Dehn, 348 S.W.2d 603 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1961), wherein the qualifying witness was permitted to explain the unorthodox
business record system used by the feed store which employed her.
126. This principle would seem to have been generally applicable both to regular
entries and to parties' account books.
127. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1521 (1940); see also § 1537.
128. 205 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947).
129. See, e.g., State v. Cheatham, 340 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1960) (pathologist dead who
made post-mortem examination); Kitchen v. Wilson, 335 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. 1960) (optom-
etrist who made record ill and unable to attend court); York v. Daniels, 241 Mo. App.
809, 259 S.W.2d 109 (1953) (pathologist dead who made post-mortem examination).
130. 328 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
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the testimony of a newly-hired office girl, although the physician who pre-
pared the records was, according to the girl's testimony, in his office at the
time. The Missouri Supreme Court observed that "Even though he was
available, the testimony of the doctor was not necessary to render the record
admissible in evidence. . . .The law recognizes that records made and
relied upon in the regular course of business may be regarded as trustworthy
without verification of all persons who contributed to them." '31
Although the clear import, then, of the Uniform Law is that it is not
necessary to account for the absence of the person who made the record,
some question may nevertheless be raised as to the practical wisdom of the
rule in all cases. For example, in a personal injury action the plaintiff might
well introduce only the physician's office records under the Uniform Law,
and not call the physician as a witness at all; plaintiff might rely solely upon
the testimony of other physicians who had examined him, or indeed, intro-
duce no medical testimony other than the records. Defendant would thereby
be deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff's physcian.
The immediate answers to this objection are twofold: defendant could
resort to discovery procedures and take the physician's deposition, or could
subpoena the physician as a witness. A deposition, of course, might be use-
less if the plaintiff asserted the physician-patient privilege; in such case the
defendant could only wait until trial and hope that the physician testified,
or subpoena him to testify. But assuming that a deposition is taken and that
the physician's testimony in his deposition is damaging to defendant but less
damaging than the physician's office records, the defendant's path may not
yet be clear. How is he to get this before the jury? The deposition cannot
be read in evidence unless the physician is shown to be unavailable; how-
ever, he is not unavailable, but is within the reach of judicial process.
The only answer may be to subpoena the physician. But if defendant does
subpoena him, whose witness will he be? Certainly his testimony will have
to be offered as a part of defendant's case-and its content may be unfavor-
able to defendant. Further, defendant will be forced to examine the phy-
sician on direct, and will not have available the devices of cross-examination
to assist him. The upshot may be that, as a practical matter, defendant will
be unable, or at best only able after much struggle, to disclose to the jury the
fact that the office record is more favorable to plaintiff than the actual
facts warrant.
The solution to this problem-if it is a problem of any substance-is not
apparent. Certainly under the express language of the Uniform Law the
131. Id. at 681-82. See also State v. Payne, 342 S.W.2d 950 (Mo. 1961), where the
physician who made the record was not shown to have been unavailable.
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absence of the maker of the record need not be accounted for.132 And yet to
hold that the record is admissible when the maker is plainly available ap-
pears to be unrealistic, and to savor of injustice. Is it not possible to achieve
some middle ground?
I. Weight to be Given Records
Business records are to be considered by the trier of fact along with all
the other evidence in the case, oral or written, and do not occupy any privi-
leged or superior status. Certainly business records cannot be said to be
"conclusive" evidence of the facts they contain.
For a period in recent years, the Kansas City Court of Appeals repeatedly
held that hospital records, unless contradicted or impeached, were con-
clusive as to the facts stated therein."3 However, in Baugh v. Life & Gas.
Ins. Co.,"' the Missouri Supreme Court held that hospital records have
no conclusive effect, their advantage over oral testimony being merely that
they can be considered "more reliable" because reduced to writing at or
near the time of the event recorded therein. Earlier, the supreme court had
held in an en banc decision that a physician's "certificate of physical ca-
pacity" based upon a medical examination was not conclusive upon that
question in an action for aid to dependent children benefits."'
J. Absence of Record
If the admissibility of business records depends upon the circumstantial
guarantee of their trustworthiness, because they are kept in the regular course
of a business and are relied upon for business purposes, it would seem in a
132. Yet the necessity basis for admission of business records has not been completely
ignored by the Missouri courts under the Uniform Act. Thus in Thomas v. Wade, 361
S.W.2d 671, 677 (Mo. 1962) (en bane), the court said: "One purpose of the Uniform
Business Records Act is to make such record evidence admissible (assuming the making
of the record of such act, condition or event meets the minimum requirements) when
the person cannot testify personally because he is unavailable, or as in this case has no
personal recollection of the act."
133. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 279 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. Ct. App.
1955); Hendricks v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 240 Mo. App. 557, 210 S.W.2d 706
(1948). The St. Louis Court of Appeals adopted this view in Russell v. Missouri Ins.
Co., 232 S.W.2d 812 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950), but reversed itself in Baugh v. Life & Cas.
Ins. Co., 299 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957), which was certified to the supreme court
because of conflict with the Kansas City court's decisions.
134. 307 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1957). But compare Randall v. Western Life Ins. Co.,
336 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960), where a death certificate was said to have
"conclusively established the cause of insured's death .... "
135. Ellis v. State Dept. of Pub. Health & Welfare, 365 Mo. 674, 285 S.W.2d 634
(1954) (en bane).
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given situation that either the presence or absence of a business entry should
be of probative value. In other words, if business records are of sufficient
integrity that they are admissible as evidence of the existence of facts re-
ported in them, they should be evidence of the non-existence of facts not
reported in them, if it would have been within the regular course of business
to record such facts.
The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law makes no reference to
the probative weight, if any, to be afforded a record containing no entry
where one might be expected under the adversary's theory of the case; and
there seem to be no Missouri cases dealing with the point. It should be noted,
however, that both Rule 63(14) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence and
the 1948 Missouri Proposed Code of Evidence".6 make explicit provision for
the admissibility of evidence of the absence of an entry. Moreover, if the
issue were raised before a Missouri appellate court under the Uniform Law,
it is very likely that under the broad and meaningful interpretation given
the Law by our courts, it would be held that evidence of a record's absence
is admissible where properly qualified, although the Uniform Law itself
speaks only of "a record of an act."
K. Applicability of Uniform Law to Criminal Proceedings
The language of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law is silent
as to whether the Law is applicable only in civil cases, or whether it applies
to criminal cases as well. The Missouri courts have held, consistently with
courts in other jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Law or similar
legislation," 7 that the Law applies to criminal cases. 3 In fact, defendants,
136. EvIDENCE CODE CoMmrrTEE OF THE MissouRI BAR, MissouRI EVIDENCE CODE
PROPOSED § 11.09 (1948).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Leathers, 135 F.2d 507, 511 (2d Cir. 1943), holding
that the federal act, now 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732 (Supp. 1963), is applicable to criminal
cases and does not thereby violate the sixth amendment; in partial justification the court
observed, "We think that business records kept as a matter of ordinary routine are often
likely to be more reliable than dying declarations," which were a recognized hearsay
exception.
138. In the following Missouri cases the Uniform Law has been used by the state:
State v. Weindorf, 361 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. 1962); State v. Brown, 360 S.W.2d 618 (Mo.
1962); State v. Redding, 357 S.W.2d 103 (Mo. 1962); State v. Payne, 342 S.W.2d 950
(Mo. 1961); State v. Cheatham, 340 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1960); State v. Lunsford, 338
S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1960); State v. Tolias, 326 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. 1959); State v. Churchill,
299 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1957); State v. Baker, 276 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. 1955); State v.
Rohman, 261 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1953). Cf. State v. Winn, 324 S.W.2d 637 (Mo. 1959);
State v. Johnson, 286 S.W.2d 787 (Mo. 1956); State v. Hampton, 275 S.W.2d 356
(Mo. 1955) (en banc).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1964/iss1/6
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
as well as the state, have sought to avail themselves of the Law's provisions. "'
Perhaps the most immediate objection to the extension of the Uniform
Law to criminal cases lies in its possible conflict with the Missouri con-
stitutional provision "that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face ....
However, in the only case in which the constitutional question was squarely
raised, State v. Lunsford, the supreme court tersely answered:
As to the contention that this record was hearsay, depriving defendant
of his right of cross-examination, it is sufficient to say this was admissible
under the Business Records as Evidence Law ... .
Conceding, then, that the Uniform Law is applicable to criminal pro-
ceedings, the further question arises, whether the Law should be applied as
liberally in criminal cases as it is in civil cases, in view of the constitutional
provision and the higher standards of proof which have traditionally been
required in criminal prosecutions. Significantly, the Missouri courts have
not discussed the issue, and a reading of the reported decisions would seem
to indicate that the appellate courts, at least, have not differentiated in any
noticeable degree between civil and criminal cases. Still, the constitutional
question lurks in the background, since, as Judge Augustus Hand noted in
United States v. Leathers, "the permissible extension" of hearsay rule ex-
ceptions in the light of the constitutional provision probably "is a question
of degree." '42
Viewed in terms of justice for the accused, and considering such matters
as the requirement that material witnesses for the prosecution be indorsed
upon the information, the protection accorded the accused through the pre-
sumption of innocence and the higher standard of proof, and the general
feeling that the defendant should not be subjected to undue surprise in the
course of the trial, it may be that the full implications of the Rossomanno
case and subsequent civil decisions should not be extended to criminal cases;
in short, that the courts ought to create different standards for criminal cases.
Certainly where the maker of a record is not unavailable, there are cogent
reasons for requiring his appearance as a witness-and these reasons are
stronger in a criminal than in a civil case.
139. State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1957); State v. McCormack, 263 S.W.2d
344 (Mo. 1954). Interestingly, in neither of these cases did the defendant sufficiently
qualify the proffered business records, and the trial court's action in rejecting the records
was upheld.
140. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18(a).
141. 338 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Mo. 1960).
142. 135 F.2d 507, 511 (2d Cir. 1943).
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Examine, for example, the 1961 decision in State v. Payne,143 a homicide
prosecution, where the record of the post-mortem examination of the victim
was produced by the chief clerk for the coroner's office. The physician who
made the examination did not testify, and there is no showing in the opinion,
at least, that he was unavailable. The record was held admissible, and
Rossomanno was cited as authority therefor.
It does not appear from the opinion whether the trial court made any
effort to ascertain if the physician who made the examination was unavail-
able; but from other decisions under the Law, it seems clear that the trial
court had no discretion in the matter: as long as the records were produced
by a custodian or other qualified witness and properly qualified under the
Law, the state was entitied to have them admitted. It would have made no
difference if the physician who made the examination had been a spectator
in the courtroom; he would not have been required as a witness. Of course,
it is true that the defendant might have subpoenaed the physician as a wit-
ness. But it is equally true that the physician was more "available" and prob-
ably more friendly to the state, that the defendant's right to discovery-to
ascertain in advance what the physician knew or would testify to--was not
as broad as in civil cases, that the defendant's possible indigence might have
limited his effective pretrial representation and that the defendant should
not have been forced to call one of the state's principal witnesses as his own
merely to seek to place the whole story of the prosecution's case before the
jury.144
In short, it may be well and good in mercantile and similar civil cases to
obviate the requirement that the maker of a business record must be shown
to be unavailable before the record may be admitted without his testimony.
Judicial and commercial convenience may so dictate. But in criminal cases
where life or liberty is at stake, convenience should be secondary. For this
reason, it is believed that in criminal cases the trial court should be given the
power to require that the makers of business records, if available, be pro-
duced as witnesses; to require the very best evidence that the state can pro-
duce in order to guarantee the fairest trial possible for the accused.
L. Practice Under the Uniform Law: Some Suggestions
Properly understood and properly applied, the Uniform Business Records
as Evidence Law can be of substantial assistance to trial counsel both in
143. 342 S.W.2d 950 (Mo. 1961).
144. Contrast State v. Brown, 360 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. 1962), where the business rec-
ords were admitted not in the state's case-in-chief, but in rebuttal, in order to overcome
evidence adduced by the defendant. Here, where defendant in effect invited the use of
the records, was a valid place for a liberal application of the Uniform Law.
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securing the admission of helpful business records into evidence and in aid-
ing in the rejection of unqualified records and writings. A review of the
reported Missouri decisions, however, leads to the conclusion that all too
often trial counsel have not properly understood or properly applied the
Uniform Law; in a number of cases inadequate objections and offers of
proof have failed to preserve the alleged errors of the trial court for review
by the appellate court.
One of the basic errors which trial counsel have made in this area is the
failure to state fully or correctly the grounds for objection to the introduction
of a business record. Thus in Happy v. Blanton," counsel made a general
objection to the admissibility of an employment record, stating in part that
"This is hearsay and is not admissible in total, if admissible in part, and we
object because it is hearsay." The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the
action of the trial court admitting the record:
If any part or parts of the respective exhibits were admissible, the ob-
jection as to that exhibit was properly overruled . . . Portions of each
exhibit were clearly admissible.146
Likewise in Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 4" a "blanket objection"
directed to the whole of a hospital record was held inadequate because a
part of the record was admissible; clearly it is only when all parts of the
record are inadmissible that a general objection can be used.
An objection to business records because they are "hearsay" is plainly
insufficient. It has been pointed out in many Missouri cases that while
business records are hearsay, the purpose of the Uniform Law has been to
make such records admissible, and therefore business records which qualify
under the Law are no longer objectionable because they are hearsay, but
some other ground for exclusion must be stated. 48 As recently as 1962 the
supreme court stated in State v. Weindorf:
There is no merit to the objection that records were hearsay. The
purpose and effect of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law
was to make admissible records or other entries which would be hearsay
and inadmissible without the law. 49
Accordingly, where the objection relates to the fact that the business records
as offered constitutes multiple hearsay or "hearsay twice removed," counsel
145. 303 S.W.2d 633, 641 (Mo. 1957).
146. Id. at 641.
147. 365 Mo. 677, 285 S.W.2d 663 (1956).
148. See, e.g., Thomas v. Wade, 361 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. 1962) (en bane); Rosso-
manno v. Laclede Cab Co., 328 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1959) (en bane); Allen v. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co., 365 Mo. 677, 285 S.W.2d 663 (1956); State v. Hampton, 275 S.W.2d
356 (Mo. 1955) (en bane); Hermann v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 345 S.W.2d 399
(Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
149. 361 S.W.2d 806, 810-11 (Mo. 1962).
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should not frame his objection simply in terms of "hearsay," but should
carefully point out that the record is objectionable because it contains hear-
say, and the nature of such hearsay should be stated.
In several instances the objections made during trial were clearly insuffi-
cient, and the parties sought to enlarge upon the objection by supplying
additional reasons in the new trial motion 5 ' or on appeal 5 ' as to why the
record should not have been admitted. The Missouri Supreme Court's re-
joinder in Thomas v. Wade is noteworthy: the "trial court is not to be con-
victed of error in the admission of evidence for reasons not presented to it
at the time."'5 2 And certainly where there has been no objection whatever
raised at trial, it is too late to argue the question of admissibility when the
case is before the appellate court."'
Where counsel offers a business record into evidence but it is rejected by
the court, it is necessary that an adequate offer of proof be made for the
record, indicating the nature and content of the proffered record. Thus in
State v. McCormack an offer of proof as to a hospital record was held in-
sufficient to preserve the point for appellate consideration where the offer
failed "to indicate the contents of the excluded records, or what, if any-
thing, they would reveal in connection with the subjects of which they
treat. .... 154
In other cases, perhaps unintentionally, counsel have admitted in open
court that a record sought to be introduced by the opposing side was regular
or authentic;15 such concessions leave counsel in no position to urge in
new trial motions or on appeal that the record was not regular or au-
thentic."' This does not mean that counsel should never stipulate the ad-
150. State v. Weindorf, 361 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. 1962); State v. Brown, 360 S.W.2d
618 (Mo. 1962); State v. Payne, 342 S.W.2d 950 (Mo. 1961); State v. Churchill, 299
S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1957).
151. Thomas v. Wade, 361 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. 1962) (en bane); Hermann v. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co., 345 S.W.2d 399 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
152. 361 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Mo. 1962) (en bane).
153. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Cone, 338 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1960). See
also Boehm v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 368 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1963), where defendant's
hospital admission record showing "alcoholic breath" was admitted at trial; it was held
to be too late on appeal to raise for the first time the objection that the record contained
a privileged communication. But this does not mean that where part of a record has
been admitted without objection, an objection to another part will not be sustained.
Dickerson v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 365 Mo. 738, 286 S.W.2d 820 (1956) (en bane).
154. 263 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Mo. 1954).
155. Melton v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 474, 251 S.W.2d 663 (1952) (en
bane); cf. Conser v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 266 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 828 (1954).
156. Thus in Thomas v. Wade, 361 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Mo. 1962) (en bane), plain-
tiff's counsel said, after examining police department records offered by defendant, "I
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missibility of non-controversial records; clearly in many instances common
sense will dictate that expense and valuable time be saved through such
stipulations. 5 '
Reference should also be made to the doctrine of curative admissibility
as it applies to business records. In Dorn v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 5"'
respondent had introduced in evidence parts of a hospital record without
properly qualifying it under the Uniform Law; when appellant offered other
parts of the same record, respondent objected because of failure to comply
with the Law. The appellate court held that it was error to sustain respon-
dent's objection, since by having originally offered the record, "respondent
so far affirmed the admissibility of the records as to preclude him from ob-
jecting to appellant's offer of the remaining portions of the record . . . . An
objection to the admissibility of evidence is waived where the same or similar
evidence has been adduced by the party rejecting." 1s9
It has been pointed out above that under the Uniform Law the trial court
possesses considerable discretion in whether or not to admit a particular
record, and that the trial court's action in this regard will very likely be up-
held by an appellate court. Further, in keeping with the purposes of the
Law, the appellate courts have given some indication that they look with
favor upon a liberal exercise of this discretion by the trial courts. On the
other hand, counsel cannot safely assume that the trial court will exercise a
broad discretion in his favor and thereby reduce the showing which must be
made to qualify a record; moreover, in a given case, strenuous objection by
opposing counsel may impel the trial court to require strict compliance with
don't think they are proper records, but I will withdraw an objection to these records
as such. As to the contents thereof, certain portions may or may not be objectionable.
I will waive the objection as to their authenticity." On appeal it was held that this
express waiver precluded any argument by plaintiff that the records were improperly
admitted because they were photostatic copies. In this connection, compare Mo. REv.
STAT. §§ 109.120, .130 (1959).
157. See, e.g., Forshey v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., 337 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App.
1960), a workmen's compensation proceeding in which it was agreed by the parties that
hospital and medical records could be admitted without the testimony of a custodian or
other qualified witness.
158. 250 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
159. Id. at 865. See also Thomas v. Wade, 361 S.W.2d 671, 676 (Mo. 1962) (cn
banc), where the court said that plaintiff "cannot treat the records as qualifying under
the Uniform Business Records Act for matters therein she wants to place before the jury,
and deny they are so qualified for matters therein the defendant wants to present." Com-
pare Dickerson v. St. Louis Pub. Sew. Co., 365 Mo. 738, 286 S.W.2d 820 (1956) (en
banc), where it was held that plaintiff's counsel's failure to object and subsequent
cross-examination as to the part of an employment record dealing with salary, ability and
commencement and termination of employment did not render admissible under the
Dorn rule another part of the same employment record relating to a medical examina-
tion when plaintiff's counsel made a proper objection thereto.
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the requirements of the Uniform Law. Therefore, in the absence of a stipu-
lation or other agreement as to the admissibility of particular records, it is
strongly advisable that counsel be prepared in every case to meet the full
requirements of the Uniform Law. But not only should counsel be prepared
to meet the requirements of the Law; to avoid possible prejudice to his case
counsel should actually meet these requirements fully in offering the records
in evidence, even if the trial court has not insisted upon complete compli-
ance. The best example of the need to qualify business records completely
is found in the Rossomanno case,' where plaintiff's objection to the ad-
mission of medical records into evidence had been overruled by the trial
court; on appeal the Missouri Supreme Court, justifying the trial court's
action, said in part:
The plaintiff himself introduced in evidence the records of two hospitals
and the file of an insurance company. While the defendant did not
object, it is significant that the plaintiff did not attempt to qualify his
identifying witnesses according to the standards he seeks to impose on
the defendant; for instance, the only qualification shown by the wit-
ness who produced the insurance company's file was that he was "con-
nected with" the insurance company.' 6'
Thus, because plaintiff had not qualified his records fully under the Uniform
Law-perhaps due to the failure of the defendant to object or to an easy-
going attitude on the part of the trial court-plaintiff lost his right to com-
plain when defendant did not comply with the Law and the trial court ad-
mitted defendant's evidence over plaintiff's objection.
One final problem: where, as in the Rossomanno case, business records
are offered and received in evidence through the testimony of a custodian,
and the person who made the records, although not shown to be unavailable,
is not called as a witness, may opposing counsel argue to the jury that an
unfavorable inference should be drawn because of the maker's failure to
testify? This question has arisen only once in connection with the Uniform
Law. In Caffey v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,"'0 a railroad equipment fore-
man produced a speed tape from defendant's locomotive, and the tape was
admitted into evidence, although the foreman was not the custodian and
had no knowledge as to who had written certain identifying data on the
tape. Plaintiff's counsel argued to the jury the failure of defendant to call
as a witness the person who had written upon the tape; it was held in view
of the general inadequacy of the testimony offered by defendant to qualify
the speed tape, that plaintiff's argument was justified. It is somewhat doubt-
160. Rossomanno v. Laclede Cab Co., 328 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
161. Id. at 683.
162. 292 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
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ful whether the Caffey decision is of much assistance in dealing with the
general problem, both because of the narrow scope of the facts there in-
volved, and because the Caffey case was decided before Rossomanno.
Generally, where a witness is "more available" to one party than to his
opponent, and that witness has knowledge superior to other evidence ad-
duced, but the party does not call him to testify, the opponent may argue
to the jury that an unfavorable inference should be drawn because the wit-
ness was not called; that is to say, that had the witness been called, his testi-
mony would have been less favorable than the other evidence offered."'
Thus there are three elements: (1) that the witness be "peculiarly available"
to the party; (2) that the witness have superior knowledge as to some
relevant fact; and (3) that the party not call the witness to testify. The
third element is not difficult to define, and the first has been the subject of a
good deal of judicial commentary in Missouri, some of it quite recent.1"
But in the context of the Rossornanno case, the second element may prove
troublesome.
It has been said that the "unfavorable inference may not be drawn where
the witnesses produced had equal or superior knowledge to those not pro-
duced."' 65 Consequently, the question is whether it can be said that the
business record produced contained knowledge or factual matter equal or
superior to that possessed by the person who made the record and who did
not testify. If so, then the unfavorable inference cannot properly be drawn.
The language of the Rossomanno case would seem to indicate that the
inference should not be drawn under these circumstances, because the record
is at least equal to the memory of the person who made it, particularly in
view of the trustworthiness of business records. As the court said in answer
to the argument that the physician who made part of the record should have
been called as a witness, "it is inconceivable that a busy medical practitioner
would have an independent recollection of each entry made in his business
records and be able to testify from personal recollection as to when and by
whom all entries were made."'66 Clearly the court did not find as a matter
of law that the record contained equal or superior information; nor was the
question raised as to whether the inference could properly be argued. But
the seeds of such a holding are in the opinion.
163. See, e.g., Russell v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 251 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1952);
Wilson v. Miss Hulling's Cafeterias, 360 Mo. 559, 229 S.W.2d 556 (1950).
164. Bartlett v. Cain, 366 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); Adam Hat Stores, Inc.
v. Kansas City, 307 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957); Comment, 22 U. KAN. Crry L.
REv. 95 (1953).
165. Wilson v. Miss Hulling's Cafeteria, 360 Mo. 559, 570, 229 S.W.2d 556, 562
(1950).
166. Rossomanno v. Laclede Cab Co., 328 S.W.2d 677, 681-82 (Mo. 1959) (en
banc).
Washington University Open Scholarship
BUSINESS RECORDS AS EVIDENCE
Nevertheless, it is submitted that when the maker is available as a wit-
ness, but only the record itself is produced through some other witness, it
should be permissible for opposing counsel to argue that the maker's testi-
mony would have been less favorable than the record itself.1 17 This argu-
ment should be permitted to offset, at least in part, the fact that the record
itself cannot be cross-examined; the fact that the record may very possibly
be more complete and certainly less equivocal than the testimony of a wit-
ness; the tendency on the part of the jury to give more weight to written
than to oral evidence; the ability of the jury to take the written records into
the jury room with them, if the discretion of the trial court allows; and last,
but not least, the very real possibility that the reason the maker was not
called as a witness was because his testimony would have been less favorable
than the written record.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it appears that over the past fifteen years the Missouri
courts have had a great deal of experience with the Uniform Business Rec-
ords as Evidence Law, and that they have been required to construe and
apply its provisions in many varied fact situations. In applying the Unifrom
Law, the Missouri appellate courts have continually sought to realize the
purposes for which the Law was adopted: to cast off the harsh and un-
reasonable common law restrictions relating to business records, and to bring
the law into line with modern business experience and practice. As pointed
out in the foregoing pages, a liberal construction of the Law has now been
achieved, partly through the holdings and dictum of the appellate courts,
and partly through the steady emphasis by those courts upon the fact that
the trial court possesses a broad discretion in determining the admissibility
of business records under the Uniform Law, and that the exercise of that
discretion will seldom be interfered with by the appellate courts. It is per-
haps true that in relation to certain proceedings, such as criminal prosecu-
tions, the requirements of the Uniform Law should be more strictly applied;
but it is likewise highly probable that as a matter of actual practice the trial
courts tend to exercise a tighter discretion over the admission of business
records in criminal prosecutions, from the very nature of these proceedings
and the higher burden of proof traditionally involved. Therefore, only time
will tell whether the appellate courts will retrench somewhat upon the pres-
ent liberal construction of the Law, or whether further broadening will occur
in the Law's application.
167. This assumes, of course, that the maker is not equally available to both parties,
but is "peculiarly available" to the party offering the record.
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